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of price discrimination, as it is applied to information goods
and services. Product differentiation and bundling theories
are both considered along with the mainstream pricing
theory, with respect to their potential application to digital
products.
It is argued that issues arising from the
implementation of pricing policies to digital information
goods and services potentially jeopardise the efficiency of
these pricing strategies. Finally, having assessed the theory
and application of cost and pricing structures of information,
the implications of applying such pricing structures are
considered in terms of welfare enhancement and efficiency
gains. The pricing strategies associated with infrastructure
and connection to the network are not considered. It is
assumed that consumers and firms have access to the Internet
at a constant fee.

Abstract-Many analysts argue that the Internet is producing
a fundamental change in the way that business works. The
network economy grows faster every day. Internet markets are
developing rapidly with information being the single most
traded commodity on the Internet. This paper looks at the
extent to which conventional pricing theory applies to this type
of good and whether it requires modifications in order to be
applicable to cyberspace. Do issues such as the ease of consumer
arbitrage activity, privacy or convergence constitute a major
impediment to the application of conventional price theory? The
thesis considers these issues with particular reference to the
implications for consumer welfare on the one hand and
economic efficiency on the other.
The findings of the research with respect to the economic
theory’s applicability to the digital information goods and
services traded on the Internet is mitigated. The diverse pricing
schemes will be applicable according to different industries
trading electronically.
For the establishments of price
discriminatory schedules to be efficient and welfare enhancing,
three conditions must be reunited: side issues such as consumer
arbitrage, unbundling ought to be resolved and the seller ought
to be aware of consumer price sensitiveness and market output
must increase.

II. COST STRUCTURE OF DIGITAL INFORMATION
Information goods have high fixed costs of production
and low variable costs of reproduction.1 The fixed cost can
be considered as “sunk” or non-recoverable cost once it is
invested in the production process. Contrary to a common
view, however, the marginal cost is not zero. Variable costs
must incorporate the copyrights cost involved with the sale of
each commodity.2 In addition to these copyright costs,
network costs should also be embodied in the variable costs
scheme.
Note that Whinston (1997) incorporates a congestion
component in the variable costs curves.3 Congestion depends
on the distribution of quantity demanded over time and its
effects should be included in a dynamic model. Congestion
will occur if demand for a digital product/service is highly
concentrated at a point in time and exceeds the capacity of
dissemination of the network provider.
Moreover, for long run marginal cost or fully distributed
cost some fraction of total fixed cost needs to be accounted
for. Mathematically, the total costs (TC) to produce the ith
unit for person j are represented as follows:4

Key Words: Digital Information goods and services,
Electronic Commerce, Consumer Arbitrage, Price
Discrimination, Welfare and Efficiency
I. INTRODUCTION
The network economy grows faster every day. Potential
markets on the Internet are developing at a rapid pace.
Information is the single most traded commodity on the Net.
Recent literature on the economics of the Internet has
attempted to apply tools of long-established economic theory
to the goods and services bought and sold throughout the
network. These goods and services are referred to as digital
information product and services, which represent what the
content of the Internet, essentially the World Wide Web,
provides on a commercial basis. In applying economic
theory, especially pricing theory, to the Internet, the
fundamental question that arises for economists is whether
the Internet, and more specifically commerce on the Net, is so
different from conventional markets that conventional
economic theory either does not apply or needs modification
to be applied successfully?
This Paper investigates briefly the cost structure of
digital information products, followed by the extent to which
traditional pricing theory applies to digital information. It
revises briefly the theory of pricing, in particular the theory
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A. First-Degree
TC i , j = S + cqi , j

The first-degree price discrimination is also termed
perfect price discrimination. In this case, consumers have
unit demand and the producer knows exactly consumer’s
marginal willingness to pay as well as being able to avoid the
arbitrage problem. The Producer will charge individualised
prices set to equal consumer’s marginal willingness to pay, or
“reservation price”. The “reservation price” is the highest
price the buyer is willing to pay for one unit of the
commodity. Perfect price discrimination is rarely observable
in the real world.

Here c is the marginal cost of production, qi,j is the ith output
for person j and S is the fraction of the sunk costs recovered
by person j buying the ith good. As the share of acquiring the
good increases, a greater amount of the sunk costs are
recovered so that the sale of the commodity is profitable. In
part, it is this mix of high production and low reproduction
costs that causes difficulty for pricing and cost recovery. In
economic theory, price discrimination is a common solution
to this problem.

B. Second-degree
The second-degree price discrimination is also known as
non-linear pricing. Through this process of discrimination,
the price per unit of output is dependent on the quantity
purchased by the consumer. The system of pricing implies
quantity discounts and quantity premium.

III. THEORY OF PRICE DISCRIMINATION
The theory of price discrimination is generally discussed
within a monopoly framework. Although the theory of price
discrimination is directly relevant to this paper, monopolypricing schemes are not discussed here. The theory of price
discrimination involves selling different units of an identical
product at different prices to the same or different consumers.
This allows the producer to discriminate with respect to an
exogenous (such as age or gender) or an endogenous (such as
time, amount and type of purchase) classification. It directs
the consumer towards self-selection, as the consumer chooses
the category he fits in best. Self-selection may be precarious
for fraudulent moves and lead to arbitrage problems.
Even though this drawback exists, price discrimination
seems to be adopted, as it enhances profits, and potentially
enhances welfare and efficiency in pricing. The pricing
scheme is attractive for firms to increase profit, but is it
necessarily improving the efficiency and economic welfare as
intended? The effects of price discrimination on efficiency
were first analysed by Ramsey (1927).5 Ramsey looked at
the magnitude of efficiency gains through his own style of
pricing (Ramsey Pricing). Efficiency and welfare effects are
reviewed and analysed with respect to digital information
goods in the last section of this paper, and Brown and Sibley
(1986) extensively debate the same issue.6
Dupuit (1962) analysed the effect of discrimination upon
prices, output and welfare.7 He distinguished and examined
several types of discriminatory strategies, now called
“degrees” of discrimination after the taxonomy of Pigou
(1920).8
Pigou distinguishes three degrees of price
discrimination, which are briefly defined here.

C. Third-degree
In third-degree discrimination, the producer is able to
identify each customer belonging to different consumer
groups, separated from one another by more or less
distinguishable characteristics, and can charge different
prices to the members of the different groups.9
More importantly, “[e]ssentially what is required is
knowledge of group-specific demand functions.”10 It is
essential to know the elasticity of the demand with respect to
price (εp,d) to price discriminate at any of the three degrees
along with the ability to separate market according to the
different types of demand (discriminated by the firms
exogenous or endogenously). Mathematically:11
Max p i ( x i ) xi − c xi
xi
The first order condition for this particular problem is:
p i ( x i ) + p i' ( xi ) xi = c
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revenue from the low-demand section of the market without
jeopardising the high-demand component.14
A recent paper by Denackere and McAfee (1996)
proposed to differentiate products by voluntary degradation
or “damaging” of the good to suit the lower ends of the
market whilst providing the complete version of the
commodity to the high-end.15 Offering different versions of
the same product or service may surmount, by induction, the
self-selection problem implied by third-degree price
discrimination. Versioning appears to be the most popular
approach to price discrimination on the Internet.
Product differentiation, but also price discrimination,
seems to be applied strictly with respect to digital products
within the network. Authors, such as Whiston (1997) and
Shapiro and Varian (1999) give little consideration to the
potential pricing relationship between digital products and
their physical equivalent.16 Often the digital products are
either substitutes for on-line “damaged” versions of their
physical counterparts or complements to the physical
equivalent. In the latter case if the digital good actually
complements the physical commodity, the manufacturer will
find it advantageous to promote it. In the former case it will
be in the manufacturer’s interest to charge the on-line
product, recovering cost either through advertising or fees.17
Moreover the digital product may be packaged as a different
version to avoid direct competition with the off-line good.
Consider the following example of The Economist, which
illustrates versioning on the Internet.

The Elasticity of demand in market i (εi) allows one to
rewrite the latter expression in this manner:


1 
p i ( xi ) 1 −  = c
 ε i 
This latter equation illustrates the relative importance of the
elasticity of demand as an important measure for consumer’s
price sensitiveness.

IV. IS THE THEORY APPLICABLE TO THE INTERNET?
The major departure from accepted pricing theory is to
price at marginal willingness to pay. The theory of price
discrimination analyses the pricing strategies at marginal
cost, whereas information is priced at the consumer’s
marginal valuation. The style or degree in pricing that ought
to be adopted for digital information goods and services
depends on the characteristics of the goods themselves rather
than the universal application of a particular price
discrimination scheme. Two pricing strategies apply to most
goods and services traded on the net: versioning
incorporating third degree price discrimination augmented by
product differentiation, and perfect price discrimination, or
personalised pricing. 12

Cost/Revenue

Price

A. Versioning

PH

High
Type

“[…] the ‘product’ policy of a firm involving a different
adjustment of its ‘product’ in each market, and the policy of
price discrimination go hand in hand, and the former is
frequently a prerequisite of the latter.”13
Lower
Type

PL

In many respects product differentiation or versioning
appears as an extension of the third-degree price
discrimination. In the case of digital products and services,
versioning may actually be the basis for price discrimination,
contrary to the mainstream economic theory where price
discrimination is the basis for product differentiation. By
differentiating the product, the producer can divide the
market into two different demand types and can recover

0
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Fig. 1. Versions of the Economist
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gathering services. In other words, the Internet proposes the
depth rather than the breadth of information; the bundling of
desired information would really only be efficient if it
responds to the consumer’s demand criteria. Both goods and
services can be customised.

In the above, it is assumed that the cost of access to the
Internet is not counted into the price of the two online
versions.
The graph shows the different levels of
differentiation.18 The printed version will suit the customer
with a higher marginal willingness to pay. The lower-end of
the market, with a lower reservation price, can benefit from
either a full payable on-line version or an abbreviated free-ofcharge version.
This particular case highlights the
possibilities of differentiation: on-line version being a
substitute for an off-line product and versioning of the on-line
product. This example also illustrates the ability to segment
the market according to consumer’s incremental price. Free
download, free access and other give away samples are often
the result of marketing strategies whereby firms try to attract
the consumer to buy the full version of the product or service.
In this particular case, versioning (or more precisely
intentional degradation of the commodity) aims at product
promotion more than an effort to supply the lower end of the
market on top of the high-end.

C. Issues
The general argument in the literature states that simple
price discrimination theory applies to the Net. The digital
nature of online product and the difficulty of both defining
and imposing a clear online jurisdiction, however, means
there are issues that require resolution in order for the basic
theory of pricing in economics to be applicable on the Net.
1) Consumer arbitrage: The central issue is consumer
arbitrage. This is a major issue on the Internet that has yet to
be fully resolved. Consumer arbitrage can be briefly defined
as illegal reproduction and distribution of a product licensed
by firms, violating copyright. The restriction of consumer
arbitrage is required for successful price discrimination. It is
related to the basic technical properties of information,
namely transmutability and reproducibility. Illegal copies
may crowd out legitimate sales and producers may not be
able to recover their costs of production. The challenge for
the Internet is to ensure the proper implementation of
copyright and reduce consumer arbitrage. In other words, to
make copyright work in the electronic sphere.21

B. Personalised Pricing
The structure and properties of the Internet makes
personalised pricing possible, especially in the case of
information services and brokerages. Some authors, for
example Whinston (1997), seem to suggest that the electronic
economy provides the perfect background to discriminate
price at the first degree, as it is relatively easy to collect
consumer information over the network.19 In fact, in order to
apply first degree price discrimination, the manufacturer will
require detailed consumer information, since prices are
individualised. Practically, information is obtained either
through registration and billing or through observation from
search queries. Web sites collect a maximum of information
about consumers visiting and purchasing on their sites. For
example, if one searches for a piece of literature on
Amazon.com, the site will often recommend books other
clients have purchased from the same category.20
Personalising involves bundling of desired attributes
according to one’s preference.
Whether such discriminatory procedure is feasible or not
for digital information products and services is highly
dependent on the properties of the good themselves. There
are, however, important issues surrounding discrimination
that are discussed further below. Furthermore some goods
and services are adapted to the application of such
discriminatory schedules. Information agents and search
brokers services are an example of a case where
customisation is favourable. In fact, the Internet enables the
consumer to find precise information about a particular area
of interest, with the help of the information filtering and

2) Reversing Process – Unbundling: Consumer arbitrage
issue is in part connected to the ease of unbundling.
Transmutability makes it such that on the Internet it is easy to
reverse the process of both bundling and “damaging”
(versioning) goods, to re-bundle at will and recover the full
version. Both consumer arbitrage and the reversing process
imply self-selection problems so that consumers with a higher
marginal willingness to pay acquire either the full version
from another “non-official” source or acquire the lower-end
version and then recover the full version. Both cases
represent a loss of revenue for the seller, an inefficient
outcome in terms of price discrimination and a decrease in
welfare (as producer surplus is not maximised).
3) Elasticity of demand: Another issue that impedes
efficient application of the pricing schemes is the lack of
knowledge of the elasticity of demand for the diverse digital
information goods and services. Without this knowledge, it
is difficult for the seller to segment the market at the different
incremental values and to create appropriate versions of
goods. The Internet enables the seller to collect numerous
amounts of data on consumer preferences, for example, when
businesses require registered billing and subscription. This,
however, does not imply that the producer is supplied with

18
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the relative price sensitivity – the elasticity of demand - of
each buyer.

of a “free downloadable”. In this case, they can be
considered as promotional tools for the actual product for
sale.
In other words, the simplified versions of ecommodities aim at providing “experience” rather than trying
to satisfy the diverse section of the market and thereby
recovering cost non-linearly. This is corroborated by the fact
that most of these lower end goods and services are often free
and not for a minimal fee. It is, however, possible that at the
present stage of development of the Internet the lower end
incremental value is close to zero. Hence, making these
versions free is consistent with pricing theory. Furthermore,
even in this case when the firm does not attempt to recover
costs and enhance profit through the free give-away samples,
the existence of the low end versions improves welfare by
providing both types of demand (low versus high demand)
with the product in a form consistent with what they are
willing to pay.
A more crucial question is whether price differentiation
or more precisely, versioning enhances welfare in the case of
digital information goods and services?
Theoretically,
welfare will improve if and only if the output increases as a
result of the creation of versions of the product and the
24
associated price discriminating.
Is this the case for digital
information goods and services? The simple answer to this
question would be yes, given the analysis on price
discrimination and its application to e-commerce. This
conclusion is consistent with that of Shapiro and Varian
(1999).25 However, while a conventional reading of the
theory leads to this conclusion there are important caveats
that need to be stressed and which emerge from this research.
These caveats relate to the impact and operation of versioning
and third degree price discrimination in the particular context
of digital information goods and services.

4) Privacy: Another issue that arises from price
discrimination at the first degree is the loss of consumer’s
bargaining power and the related issue of privacy. By
revealing his own preference to the producer, the consumer
loses his bargaining potential to the producer, who can extract
the entire consumer surplus. This loss of bargaining power is
not very appealing from a consumer’s point of view.22 This
partly explains the recent debates over privacy issues on the
Internet, and the intentions of governments to ensure that
privacy rights are respected on the Internet:
“US internet regulation ‘is inevitable’: […] the bipartisan
Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999 was introduced into the
US Senate, […].”23

In some cases though, it is in the consumer’s interest to
provide the producer of digital information goods or services
with personal information, in order to optimise the
satisfaction yielded by the good or the services provided. If
the consumer could supervise the process of personal
information provision, privacy issues would be lessened.

V. WELFARE & EFFICIENCY
Pricing and the Internet
Although some argue to the contrary, economists would
take the view that resources on the Internet are finite. In this
case, the presence of price discrimination and product
differentiation seems to be a good scheme to improve welfare
and improve the efficiency of the allocation resources. If on
the other hand, technology keeps expanding as it has for the
last ten years and the Internet technically does not exhibit
excess capacity (relative to the number of users), then these
pricing techniques are going to be primarily about increasing
firm’s profit. They will have a role in maintaining a high
level of quality and commitment to consumers in the
provision of services and products throughout the connected
network, but most importantly in ensuring full cost recovery.
As has been argued previously there are transaction and
reproduction costs involved with the net and these need to be
covered with economic returns.
One, then, can ask the question: does the producer
intentionally create different versions of products to recover
costs and enhance profit providing both ends of the market?
The product differentiation theory is applicable for goods and
services traded on the Internet. Such versions of some goods
are available from electronic commerce sources in the form

Is Pricing Efficient?
The first crucial issue is that successful price
discrimination requires a detailed knowledge of the elasticity
of demand with respect to price. This is necessary for the
resultant prices to promote efficiency and increase welfare. It
is an important piece of information for the online seller to
acquire. Information on consumers price sensitivity or more
directly on the marginal willingness to pay enables the
producer to match each version of a good or a service with
the appropriate characteristics to the consumer at the
appropriate price. In the case of most digital information
goods and services, such knowledge is unavailable, which a
priori means that price and product differentiation is
inefficient. Data on consumer price elasticity or incremental
valuation for offline products could be used as a proxy to the

22

24

To see how sites collect information about consumers and the current
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23
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Summer 1988, p. 255
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Shapiro, Carl and Varian, Hal R., Opus Cit., 1999, pp. 20-22
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elasticity of demand or marginal willingness to pay for online
goods, depending on the different types of industries.
Information, however, on consumers will increase. As
electronic commerce for some industry grows, data is
accumulated, as online traders require registered billing. This
is the case for example with Amazon.com, which requires the
consumer to register and proposes to create a personal
account. As a result of this strategy, the supplier of books is
able to gain information about the consumer and matching
their preferences very closely to similar consumers who
purchased other books in the same category. This, however,
is not a perfect substitute for knowledge of the elasticity of
demand for specific digital goods and services, which as
noted above, is necessary for prices and product
differentiation to be optimal.
Other issues are important for welfare and efficiency
improvements to occur. The previously discussed availability
of reversing or recovering process (such as unbundling) is a
serious problem. Two important issues arise: consumer
arbitrage and self-selection. The reversing process implies
that the full versions intended for the high end of the market
could be recovered from the “damaged” version without the
online seller’s approval and without paying for the right to do
this. In this situation, the seller would loose some surplus
and be technically less efficient. Efficiency loss may also
occur due to the self-selection problem. Self-selection issue
arises, as it becomes more advantageous for some consumers
to purchase the lower end product and use recovery
techniques to re-create the full version. Different versions of
the same software may be an example, where a consumer
buys the simplest version and searches the Internet for the
upgrading parts unbundled from the full version. Another
example, somewhat different in appearance but intrinsically
the same, is the case of shared membership of a fee-based
site.
Furthermore, unbundling or the reversing process creates
consumer arbitrage problem. It should be noted that
consumer arbitrage is an issue not solely associated with the
recovering process. The presence of these illicit copies
potentially crowds out legitimate sales and the producers may
therefore not be able to recover their costs of production.
This is a major threat to firms trading electronically, which is
becoming more and more important as electronic commerce
grows and the Internet expands. Arbitrage and the reversing
process problem potentially creates high policing costs in
order to avoid the propagation of these illicit copies.
It will be necessary to resolve these issues in an efficient
way, so that the application of the price discriminatory
schemes comes close to full efficiency and maximum welfare
enhancement, ensuring a total output increase. These issues,
however, do not necessarily need to be solved for the pricing
to take place, but the potential benefits from solving these
issues, in efficiency and welfare terms, are lowered.
Furthermore, the output increase from third degree price
discrimination and versioning cannot be guaranteed. Such

total output increase is a necessary condition for welfare to
improve.
First Degree
First-degree price discrimination is, by definition,
perfect. Customising enables the producer to satisfy the
consumer fully and at the same time, the producer surplus, is
maximised. Consumer surplus, on the other hand, is equal to
zero. In other words, first degree price discrimination may be
considered as socially efficient.
First degree price
discriminating would lead to a Pareto optimal situation,
where consumer surplus would be completely extracted and
producer surplus maximised.
This pricing scheme is
applicable in the case of goods and services sold on the
Internet, but only for some particular industries. Moreover,
the online industries best fitted for this pricing strategy are
the digital information database services, which can calibrate
their supply according to a consumer’s preferences. The
number of industries, for which such scheme is possible, is
limited. Furthermore, as with versioning, issues such as
unbundling leading to consumer arbitrage problems, which
must be solved until full efficiency and welfare enhancement
can be achieved.
VI. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the main issue for this paper has been
whether long established microeconomic theories can be
easily translated to the online world. Is the Internet by nature
so different that long established theories must be changed?
The answer is a qualified “no”. The Internet can be
considered a reflection of the off-line world, which partly
explains why a lot of goods and services are identical in the
off-line and on-line world. It can also explain the attitude of
economists, such as Shapiro, Varian and Whinston, who
attempt to draw straight parallels and apply well-established
economic theory directly to the network economy. The issue,
however, is not as clear-cut as implied. The very nature of the
digital information goods and services traded on the Internet
makes consumer arbitrage relatively easy and facilitates
unbundling or reversing processes. In addition, there is an
apparent lack of knowledge of consumer’s price sensitiveness
across market segments. Therefore, while the theory is
essentially applicable, achieving the potential efficiency and
welfare gains that correct pricing could produce requires
some fundamental issues to be resolved.
The following table summarises some of the key issues that
have been identified and their implications.
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TABLE 1
SUMMARY OF ISSUES
Issue
Arbitraging across
segments

Condition Arising
Illegal copies produced in
the market place.
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Privacy

Revelation of consumer
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Reduces on-line
market opportunities
and effectiveness of
price discrimination.
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control over the
process of information
provision.
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